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It's high noon, Apple and AT&T-we really hate to break it
to you, but the jig is up.
- Engadget.com1
1. Ryan Block, iPhone Unlocked: AT&T Loses iPhone Exclusivity, ENGADGET, Aug. 24,
2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/08/24/iphone-unlocked-atandt-loses.iphone-exclusivity.
august-24-2007/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 24, 2007, less than two months after its initial
release for sale, the Apple iPhone was unlocked, untethering the
phones from the AT&T cellular network.2 Because AT&T has
exclusive rights to provide coverage for the iPhone until the year 2010,
hackers and computer enthusiasts worked feverishly to be the first to
use the iPhone on a network other than AT&T.3 Although the practice
of cell phone unlocking has been occurring for years,4 the tremendous
public interest surrounding the launch of the iPhone focused attention
on the issue like never before.
Wireless carriers can use software locks, hardware locks, or
both to disable a handset from being used on any network except the
one for which it was purchased. 5 Most handset makers, such as
Motorola and Nokia, manufacture almost identical versions of their
phones for different networks, making, for example, a new T-Mobile
customer purchase a different version of the same phone he used on
the AT&T network. As a result, most customers choose phones based
on the network they plan to use.6 The practice of linking a specific cell
phone handset to a particular network did not, of course, originate
with Apple and AT&T. T-Mobile, Verizon, and Sprint also lock
handsets to prevent them from working on competitors' networks. 7 A
network provider may sometimes unlock a customer's handset so that
the customer can take the phone overseas to use on a foreign
network,8 but generally, providers operate according to a business
2. Id.; see also Brad Stone, With Software and Soldering, AT&T's Lock on iPhone Is
Undone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at C1 (discussing various techniques used to unlock
iPhones). One method used a software package to break the SIM lock on the iPhone. Id. The
second method used a combination of hardware modifications and added software. Id.
3. See, e.g., Sumner Lemon, Race Is on to Unlock the iPhone; Because Half the Fun (if
You're a Hacker, Anyway) Is Breaking the Thing, COMPUTERWORLD, July 1, 2007,
http://www.computerworld.com/actionarticle.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9026041
(describing hackers' efforts to unlock the iPhone).
4. See, e.g., Globalunlock.com, About Us, http://www.globalunlock.com/aboutus.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2008) (explaining the origins of Global Unlock, who has been unlocking phones
since 2003); Tripod.ws, Your Cell Phone Unlocking Solution, http://www.tripod.ws/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2008) (claiming to have been unlocking phones since 1996).
5. Wireless Alliance Comment, Notice of Inquiry: In re Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies Docket No. RM
2005-11 6-7, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/index.html (document
3).
6. This is with the exception of popular new phones, which sometimes are offered only on
one network, but often filter quickly out to or have analogous products appear on other networks.
7. See Stone, supra note 2 (describing how and why carriers lock phones).
8. Candace Lombardi, Tackling the Cell Phone Unlock Game, CNET NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007,
http://www.news.com/Tackling-the-cell phone-unlock-game/2100-1039_3-6208915.html.
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model that subsidizes expensive handsets and locks customers into
multi-year contractual commitments.9 The iPhone, for instance, will
not appear on networks other than AT&T, nor will AT&T unlock it for
use overseas. If consumers want iPhones, they must use the AT&T
network and be willing to use locked phones, with all their inherent
limitations. 10
In contrast, an unlocked cell phone offers considerably more
freedom than a locked phone: it is available for use on any cellular
network with which the customer has an account.11 If a consumer has
an unlocked iPhone, he can use the iPhone on an account with T-
Mobile, 02 (a British carrier), Vodaphone (a European carrier), or any
other carrier using GSM technology.1 2 Generally, phone owners
replace the SIM cards (which carry users' phone numbers and other
personal information) in their phones whenever they switch
networks. 13 With multiple SIM cards and multiple accounts, an owner
can use the same handset on multiple networks. Alternatively, a user
could close his account with one network, purchase a new SIM card,
and switch to another network. 14 The desire to achieve this level of
portability and freedom prompted interested groups and individuals to
enter the race to unlock the iPhone, a race that was won less than two
months after the phone's release.
9. Jennifer Granick, Free the Cell Phone!, WIRED, Sept. 28, 2005, http://www.wired.com/
politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt20050968989.
10. See Leslie Cauley, i Weapon; AT&T Plans to Use Its Exclusive iPhone Rights to Gain the
Upper Hand in the Battle for Wireless Supremacy, USA TODAY, May 22, 2007, at 1B (explaining
AT&T's strategy to profit from its exclusive rights to the iPhone); AT&T Contract and Terms of
Service, available at http://www.apple.com/legaliphone/us/terms/serviceatt.html, and
http://www.apple.com/legal/iphone/us/terms/serviceall.html (describing the terms of AT&T's
wireless contract, including limits on wireless devices).
11. This proposition, of course, excludes hardware limitations. There are two types of cell
phone networks generally used: CDMA and GSM. See Joe Peacock, CDMA vs. GSM, Why You
Should Know the Difference, PC TODAY, Jan. 2006, http://www.pctoday.com/editorial
article.asp?article=articles%2F2006%2Ft0401%2F24t01%2F24t01.asp (discussing the GSM and
CDMA standards). Sprint and Verizon use CDMA; T-Mobile, AT&T, and most of the rest of the
world use GSM. Id. The two networks are non-compatible; a CDMA phone cannot work on a
GSM network. Id. Thus, the iPhone (a GSM phone) could never work on Sprint or Verizon's
network, only T-Mobile's (in the United States). Id.
12. 02, Mobile Web Services, available at http://www.o2.co.uk/services/waystoconnect/
mobilewebservices (last visited Sept. 9, 2008); Press Release, Vodafone, Vodafone Network
Obtains the Best Results in Anacom Tests (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://www.vodafone.
comlstart/media-relations/news/locaI press-reeases/portugalportuga-press-release/vodafone-
network obtains.html; T-Mobile Support, What Does GSM Stand For?, available at
http://support.t-mobile.com/knowbase/root/public/tm20403.htm#top (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
13. Switching networks is somewhat more complicated with CDMA phones, since they lack
removable SIM cards. See Peacock, supra note 11.
14. The user could also simply move their account information so that a new SIM card
would not be necessary.
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Once people began publishing their methods of unlocking the
iPhone, AT&T sent many of them cease-and-desist letters,15 grounded
in section 1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA" or "the Act"). 16 Congress passed the DMCA to curtail the
copyright piracy made possible by the new technologies of the 1990S.17
Section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA protects an owner's copyright by
making it illegal to "circumvent a technological measure" installed by
the owner.18 Essentially, the Act makes it illegal, as a separate offense,
merely to circumvent protective measures that copyright holders place
on copyrighted works; it does not require actual copying.19
For cell phones, the "copyrighted work" at issue is the software
that runs the phone, known as "firmware." The "technological
measure" that the act makes illegal to circumvent is the locking
software or hardware that the manufacturer or wireless provider
installs. Wireless service providers such as TracFone, the United
States' largest pre-paid service provider, argue that the steps they
have taken to lock the phones they sell simply are protective measures
against copyright infringement. 20 On the other hand, consumer groups
argue that cell phone locks hamper consumers' rights to choose which
network to use with their handsets. 21
Subsections 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D) of the DMCA offer an
intriguing possibility for those who are concerned that copyright law
overly restricts consumer choice. 22 These subsections allow the
Librarian of Congress to accept comments from interested parties
every three years and declare certain uses of copyrighted works legal
15. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, iPhone Unlock Hits Legal Hang-Up, http://www.iphonenano.net/
iphone-unlock-hits-legal-hang-up/iphone (last visited Sept. 29, 2008); Engadget.com,
UniquePhones's iPhone Unlock Release 'Slowed' by AT&T Lawyers, http://www.engadget.
com/2007/08/25/uniquephoness-iphone-unlock-release-slowed-by-atandt-lawyers (last visited
Aug. 8, 2008); Gizmodo.com, AT&T Cracks Down on Commercial iPhone Unlocking Groups,
http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/not-so-fast/attcracks-down-on-commercial-iphoneunlocking-groups-
293468.php (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
19. See infra Section II.A. One example of such a measure would be the digital rights
management ("DRM") software that prevents consumers from copying DVD movies.
20. TracFone Wireless Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also
Wireless Alliance Reply, Notice of Inquiry: In re Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies Docket No. RM 2005-11, available
at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply (document 14) (detailing current efforts by
TracFone to hamper cell phone unlocking businesses).
21. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 7-10 (arguing that unlocking handsets
should be exempted from the restrictions in the DMCA).
22. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(C)-(D) (2000).
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for the subsequent three years, notwithstanding the prohibitions of
the DMCA. 23 During the lead-up to the Librarian's 2006 exemption
decision, seventy-four comments and thirty-five replies were
submitted in support of or against certain proposed exemptions. 24 On
November 27, 2006, after considering the comments and replies and
holding public hearings, the Librarian declared six classes of activities
exempt from the section 1201 regulations (hereinafter "the November
27th solution"). 25 Class number five exempts "[c]omputer programs in
the form of firmware that enable wireless telephone handsets to
connect to a wireless telephone communication network, when
circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully
connecting to a wireless telephone communication network."26
This ruling effectively made it legal for owners to unlock their
handsets for use on other networks. Because the Librarian phrased
the rule so narrowly, however, the prohibitions of sections 1201(a)(2)
and (b) that make it illegal to offer the public programs or services
that circumvent technological measures designed to protect copyrights
are still in force.27 This exemption creates a confusing dichotomy: it is
legal to unlock a phone and sell it, but it is illegal to unlock a phone
for someone else or provide instructions on how to unlock phones.
Thus, when the iPhone "unlockers" discovered how to unlock the
phones and published that information, enabling others to provide
software that would unlock iPhones automatically, they made
themselves susceptible to legal challenges by copyright owners. 28
Indeed, Tracfone has been remarkably successful at suing handset
unlockers in recent years. In at least one published case, TracFone
Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, the court flatly denied that the Librarian's
2006 exemption applied to businesses that unlock phones for sale.29
On the other side of the issue is a recent spate of lawsuits,
principally in California, against wireless providers. 30 A principal
23. Id.
24. United States Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
25. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,479 (Nov. 27, 2006).
26. Id. at 68,476.
27. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b) (2000).
28. See supra note 15.
29. 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
30. See, e.g., Third Amended Consolidated Complaint at 1-2, Meoli v. Viva Wireless, Inc.,
No. RG03086113 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter AT&T Complaint]
(suing on the basis of handset locking claims); Complaint at 2, Zill v. Sprint Spectrum Ltd.
P'ship, No. RG 03114147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Sprint
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issue in these cases is whether providers should be forced either to
unlock phones at the will of consumers or to do away with cell phone
locking altogether. 31 Many of the lawsuits based on handset locking
claims have made their way through the California courts on motions
to compel arbitration pursuant to clauses in customers' contracts. 32 On
October 10, 2007, the California Supreme Court declined to review the
Court of Appeals's decision in Gatton v. T-Mobile, which struck down
an arbitration clause as unconscionable.3 3 This ruling, as well as
similar rulings against AT&T and Cingular,34 clear the way for
plaintiffs to sue the nation's largest wireless providers over handset
locking. Aside from its import for applying the doctrine of
unconscionability, the outcome of Gatton and other cases will greatly
affect the relationship between wireless providers and their
customers.
The Librarian of Congress's exemption is scheduled to expire in
2009, which means that the November 27th solution is merely a
temporary one. The authors of the DMCA could not have predicted the
unique challenges the Act would face in the coming years. The Act's
effectiveness in dealing with today's technological realities has often
been questioned. 35 In light of current legal challenges by both
Complaint] (suing on the basis of handset locking claims); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (suing on the basis of the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions and trademark infringement, among other grounds); Complaint at 1-2, Nokia v. Sol
Wireless, No. 1:06-cv-20011-CMA (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2006) (suing on the basis of trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition, among other grounds); Complaint at
4-7, Parrish v. Sprint PCS, No. 03CC09022 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County July 10, 2003) (suing
on the issue of unfair early termination fees); Complaint at 5-8, Tucker v. AT&T Wireless Servs,
Inc., No. 03CC09437 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County July 22, 2003) (suing on the issue of unfair
early termination fees); Complaint at 8-19, Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., No. RG03097749 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County May 22, 2003) (suing on the issues of
unfair contract terms regarding arbitration and termination fees, and false advertising).
31. Complaint at 17-19, 24 Holman v. Apple, Inc., No. C0705152 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007);
Sprint Complaint, supra note 30, at 11-12; AT&T Complaint, supra note 30, at 22-23; Complaint
at 11-12, Nguyen v. Cellco P'ship, No. RG04137699 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Jan. 23,
2004) [hereinafter Verizon Complaint].
32. Gatton v. T.Mobile, 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 574, 577-78 (Cal. Ct. App.-4th 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 2501 (2008); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, 2005 WL 2420719, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App.-lst Oct. 3, 2005), cert. denied, Cingular Wireless, LLC, v. Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188 (2006);
Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., Nos. A106061, A106340, A106341, 2005 WL 2404427, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App.-1st Sept. 30, 2005), cert. denied, New Cingular Wireless Servs, Inc. v. Meoli, 547
U.S. 1206 (2006).
33. David Kravets, Court Clears Way for Mobile-Phone- Unlocking Lawsuit Against T-
Mobile, WIRED, Oct. 11, 2007, available at http://www.wired.com/politics/law/
news/2007/10/tmobile.
34. Gatton, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 577-78; Parrish, 2005 WL 2420719, at *1; Meoli, 2005 WL
2404427, at *1.
35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV., 1095-1140 (2003)
(arguing that the DMCA's anticircumvention measures create a "paracopyright" regime that far
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consumers and corporations, the area of cell phone rights and
responsibilities is ripe for review.
This Note will offer a solution to the current mishmash of
policies regarding cell phone unlocking and fair use of the copyrighted
intellectual property associated with unlocking. It contends that, as a
first step, Congress should not only statutorily codify the exemption
for unlocking of cell phones, but also should shield the tools and
services used to accomplish unlocking from DMCA repercussions.
More importantly, this Note will argue that the DMCA was not
designed, and is ill-equipped, to deal with phone unlocking issues.
Instead, this Note contends that copyright law is not the appropriate
forum for this dispute; rather, the problem of cell phone unlocking
belongs in the domain of U.S. telecommunications policy. This Note
will also make the case that it is in the providers' best interest to sell
unlocked cell phones.
Part II of this Note reviews the history behind the DMCA,
especially section 1201, in an attempt to clarify the goals of the Act
generally and the goals of section 1201 specifically. It also provides an
overview of the 2006 inquiry process conducted by the Librarian of
Congress and addresses the arguments made both for and against the
exemption currently in force. Finally, it examines a partial history of
U.S. telecommunications policy that relates to the wireless industry as
well as relevant legislation. Part III examines the current court
battles regarding cell phone unlocking and their likely consequences
for the future of telecommunications law. Part IV critically assesses
the status of copyright law and the intersection between litigation on
phone unlocking and U.S. telecommunications policy. Finally, this
Part proposes a solution in the form of a statutory and economic
framework to address the problems elucidated earlier in the Part.
II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE LIBRARIAN OF
CONGRESS
In an attempt to deal with the explosion of digital production
and piracy, the Congress amended U.S. copyright law in 1998 with the
DMCA, and the changes have had wide-ranging consequences. The
Act was created as a response to the digital piracy of books, movies,
outstrips Congress's intent and damages consumer interests); Jason Sheets, Copyright Misused:
The Impact of the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair and Innovative Markets, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-37 (2000) (questioning both the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions and its ability to respond to technological change); Benny Evangelista, Digital
Copyright Law Under Fire,- Millennium Act Already Out of Date, Critics Say, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Aug. 13, 2001, at D-1 (questioning whether the DMCA is already outdated).
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music, and software. 36 At the time the DMCA was passed, no one had
cell phones in mind. Years later, however, consumers and corporations
realized that the Act did, in fact, govern the gray area of cell phone
unlocking. Luckily, a forum existed to interpret and respond to
unforeseen consequences such as these: Congress created a safeguard
in the DMCA so that the Librarian of Congress could exempt certain
works from the new anti-piracy measures in the Act if he determined
that consumer rights were being harmed. 37
Part A of this section examines the inception and passage of
the DMCA. It demonstrates that Congress was overwhelmingly
concerned with the theft of books, movies, music, and software; thus,
the Act's applicability to an area of commerce that it was not designed
to govern should be questioned. Part B examines the Librarian's 2006
exemption process, which made it legal for consumers to unlock their
cell phones to use on other networks until 2009. Part C considers
other governmental actions relating to the tension between
telecommunications providers and consumers, including the 1968
Carterfone Doctrine, the 1997 Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") ruling on cell phone number portability, and the 2007
congressional subcommittee hearing on the iPhone and other wireless
innovation and consumer protection issues. Finally, Part D explores
current legislation involving consumer rights and cell phone
unlocking.
A. The DMCA: Confronting New Realities of Digital Piracy
Signed into law on October 28, 1998, the DMCA was described
as a "comprehensive digital copyright bill" that was designed, inter
alia, to criminalize the "circumvention of technologies that secure
digital copies of software, music and videos and literary works."38 The
Act, described by President Clinton as the "most extensive revision of
international copyright law in over 25 years," was originally designed
to implement two treaties: the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances
and Phonogram Treaty.39 As described by the Register of Copyrights
36. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO §104
OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT vi-vii (2001) [hereinafter DMCA § 104 REPORT].
37. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(C)-(D) (2000).
38. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter DMCA]; Jeri Clausing, Technology Bills
Languish As Congress Races for Exit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at C2.
39. Statement on Signing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1902
(October 28, 1998), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55169; World
1514 [Vol. 61:5:1507
2008] THE iPHONE AND THE DMCA 1515
("the Register"), however, the Act became a "far more comprehensive
legislative project to address a range of issues, both digital and non-
digital."40
Congress's primary reason for implementing the WIPO was to
combat piracy-that is, the theft of inherently valuable pieces of
intellectual property.41 As would be expected, neither the Register's
2001 report nor two years of debates surrounding the bill contain any
references to cell phones, firmware, mobile software, or the like. In the
congressional debates surrounding the passage of the DMCA,
however, members of Congress repeatedly expressed concern about
software, music, and video piracy.42 For example, in a House debate on
October 12, 1998, Congressman Billy Tauzin said, "As we enter this
information digital age, it becomes increasingly easy for people to
make perfect copies of other people's works; their music, their books,
their videos, their movies. In short, the WIPO treaty is an attempt
worldwide to protect those intellectual properties from thievery, from
duplication, from piracy."43 Section 1201 specifically became the heart
of the effort to implement the WIPO treaties.44 The provisions
applicable to these treaties are found in the beginning of section
1201(a)(1). 45
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
65 (1997), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocswo033.html; World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 76 (1997), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/
trtdocs_wo034.html.
40. DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
41. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10,616-18 (1998) (including statements of Representatives
Coble, Bliley, Dingell, Tauzin, Frank, Stearns, and Markey in support of the DMCA).
42. Id.
43. 144 CONG. REC. H10,617 (1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000). As explained later by the Register of Copyrights: "Legal
prohibitions against circumvention of technological protection measures employed by copyright
owners to protect their works, and against the removal or alteration of copyright management
information, were required in order to implement U.S. treaty obligations." DMCA § 104 REPORT,
supra note 36, at vi.
45. These provisions state:
No person shall circumvent a technological protection measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. No person
shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof that-(A)
is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; (B) has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological protection measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or (C) is
marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
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While Congress was implementing these broad new measures
to combat piracy, critics argued that the DMCA tilted copyright law
heavily in favor of copyright holders, most of whom are corporations. 46
Thus, by inserting safeguard provisions in the DMCA, Congress
sought to protect consumers and respond to commentators who
expressed concern over the dampening effect that the strictures of the
DMCA might have on content production, digital production and
distribution, and fair use.47 Congressman Tauzin believed the most
"important contribution" to the Act was section 1201(a)(1), which
allows the Librarian to prevent a reduction in fair use.48 Under section
1201(a)(1)(C), the Librarian of Congress may, upon recommendation of
the Register, 49 exempt certain classes of works from the anti-
circumvention measures of section 1201(a)(1)(A). 50 This exemption
should be exercised when non-infringing users of copyrighted works
are or will be adversely affected by section 1201(a)(1)(A). 51 The
Librarian was instructed under section 1201(a)(1)(C) to carry out the
first review two years after the section was enacted and every three
years thereafter. 52
In addition to the provision authorizing such exemptions,
section 104 of the Act requires the Register to produce a report on the
joint impact of the DMCA and the "development of electronic
commerce and technology" on some of the fair-use provisions of
copyright law, including sections 109 and 117. 53 Section 109, the
federal copyright statute dealing with the First Sale Doctrine, 54 is
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological protection
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
46. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 35; Timothy B. Lee, Circumventing Competition; The Perverse
Consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 564 CATO INST. POL. ANALYSIS 9 (2006),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf (claiming that "DRM systems and the
DMCA give copyright holders much greater control over their products and their customers than
they have ever enjoyed under traditional copyright law.").
47. Supra note 35.
48. 144 CONG. REC. E2144 (1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
49. The Register of Copyrights is also required to consult with the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 104; id. § 109 (encompassing the "First Sale" doctrine); id. § 117 (covering
copies, adaptations, leases and sales of such, and repairs).
54. This copyright doctrine holds that a copyright holder's control over an individual,
lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work ends when that copy is sold or given away. COPYRIGHT
IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 369 (Julie E. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). After this "first
sale," the owner of the copy may resell or give away the work without consent of the copyright
1516 [Vol. 61:5:1507
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relevant to software and End User License Agreements ("EULAs") but
is not particularly applicable to cell phone firmware and unlocking. 55
More critical to the unlocking debate, though not realized at the time,
is the effect of the DMCA on section 117 of the United States Code.
Section 117 allows consumers to produce backup copies of computer
programs and adaptations of programs only if the copy or adaptation
is created "as an essential step" in using the program. 56
In 2001, the Register issued the section 104 report,57 which was
the product of a public comment process and analysis by the U.S.
Copyright Office. Most importantly for this Note, the report addresses
concerns about the effects of section 1201 on fair use and other
noninfringing use rights of consumers. 58 Unfortunately, it concludes
that the fair use concerns affected by the DMCA were not so great as
to warrant changes to section 117 of the Act. 59
The Register concluded that, although section 117 may have
adverse effects on consumers' ability to make archival copies legally,
"such a concern appears to be minimal, since licenses generally define
the scope of permissible archiving of software, and the use of CD-ROM
reduces the need to make backup copies."60 Unfortunately for
advocates of cell phone unlocking, the Register has not addressed the
impact of the DMCA on the "adaptation" provisions of section 117.
The Register's report, then, ultimately offers no support for those who
believe that the DMCA negatively affects consumers' rights to unlock
cell phones.
But the report offers more than conclusions. A close reading of
the report demonstrates that just three years after the DMCA was
passed and two years before the first class action cell phone unlocking
suit was filed, the Register interpreted the DMCA with piracy
concerns in mind, just as Congress had when it created the law. The
Register's portrayal of the purpose of the anticircumvention measures
of section 1201 is illustrative of this mindset. In discussing copy
control measures (which can be circumvented legally since copying for
archival purposes is legal), the Register offered an analogy: "[F]air use
and other copyright exceptions are not defenses to gaining
owner so long as the owner does not infringe any of the other copyright owner's rights under 17
U.S.C. § 106. Id.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).
57. DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 36.
58. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (allowing consumers to make archival copies and/or
adaptations of works in specific circumstances).
59. DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 36, at xvii.
60. DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 36, at xvii.
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unauthorized access to a copyrighted work: Quoting a manuscript may
be a fair use; breaking into a desk drawer and stealing it is not.
Circumventing access control measures was, therefore, prohibited in
the Administration's proposed implementing legislation."61
The Register was by no means the first or only person to use
this analogy. The House Judiciary Committee Report explains the
situation with a similar analogy: "The act of circumventing a
technological protection measure put in place by a copyright owner to
control access to a copyrighted work is the electronic equivalent of
breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book."62
The congressional discussions, the Register's report, and the
text of the DMCA indicate a concern with digital piracy and attempts
to circumvent technology to steal copyrighted works. The vast majority
of cell phone unlocking, however, does not implicate piracy at all.
Unlockers do not generally attempt to steal phone software directly or
to circumvent security to steal protected software. Thus, the
overwhelming concerns of the DMCA are mismatched to the concerns
over cell phone unlocking.
The authors of the DMCA did not consider cell phones and
mobile firmware. Rather, Congress through the DMCA was dealing
with the rise in digital theft that resulted from increasing Internet
use, digital commerce, and digital production. A few years later when
cell phone use exploded worldwide, both consumers and corporations
began to realize that section 1201 of the DMCA, which was aimed at
digital piracy, incidentally regulated mobile firmware. Thus, in 2006,
the Librarian of Congress was set to deal with the new restrictions on
cell phone unlocking that section 1201 created.
B. The Librarian of Congress's 2006 Exemption Process
Included in section 1201 of the DMCA are subsections (a)(1)(C)
and (D), which direct the Librarian of Congress, in consultation with
the Register of Copyrights, to grant exemptions for certain
noninfringing classes of works from the provisions of section
1201(a)(1)(A) every three years.63  As explained in the previous
Section, Congress included this clause as a safeguard to protect the
fair use of copyrights and, according to the DMCA, to exempt such
"noninfringing uses by persons who are users of a copyrighted work
[and who] are, or are likely to be, adversely affected" by the
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 12 n.16.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)-(D).
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prohibitions of subsection (a)(1)(A).64 Thus, in 2003 and again in 2006,
the Librarian exempted certain classes of works from the
anticircumvention measures of section 1201.65
1. Comments and Reply Comments
During the exemption process, the Librarian takes a
recommendation from the Register of Copyrights and written and
aural comments from the public.66 During the 2006 public comment
period, numerous comments on a range of topics were submitted.
Several comments argued that the restrictions on circumventing
access controls guarding mobile firmware should be removed. Bases
for this argument included the advancement of consumer rights, the
necessity of handset portability between countries, and the adverse
environmental effects of the existing restrictions.
In 2006, a comment submitted by the Wireless Alliance
("Wireless Alliance comment") urged the Librarian to exempt
"computer programs that operate wireless telecommunications
handsets (mobile firmware)." 68 This exemption would have made it
legal to modify or bypass copyrighted firmware on a handset. The
Wireless Alliance comment was supported by two reply comments, one
by Mark Crocker, a software engineer and mobile phone programmer,
and another by Michael Weisman, a businessman and frequent
international traveler. 69 These comments and additional testimony
persuaded the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress to
exempt mobile firmware from the anticircumvention clauses of section
1201(a).
64. See supra Section ILA; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
66. See 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,473 (describing the public comment process for the 2006
exemption rulemaking).
67. Reply Comments of Mark Crocker, United States Copyright Office, Rulemaking on
Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to
Copyrighted Works, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply (document 9)
[hereinafter Crocker Reply Comment]; Reply Comments of Michael Weisman, United States
Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply (document 6) [hereinafter Weisman Reply Comment].
Jennifer Granick later testified at a hearing on March 23, 2006, in Palo Alto, CA, on behalf of
herself, the Wireless Alliance, and Robert Pinkerton. Jennifer S. Granick, Testimony at the
Anticircumvention Rulemaking Hearings in Palo Alto, Cal. (Mar. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/granick.pdf.
68. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 2.
69. Supra note 67.
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The Wireless Alliance comment argues persuasively that
unlocking phones is a noninfringing use of the copyrighted software
under existing statutory and case law.70 It details the extent of the
problem, explaining the different types of locks and detailing specific
unfair business practices that are contrary to FCC rulings. 71 It also
provides an overview of relevant case law and explains why phone
locking has adverse consequences for consumers, the environment,
and overall wireless competition.72 The comment's legal arguments
cover two areas of law: U.S. telecommunications policy and copyright
law.
The comment makes two arguments about U.S.
telecommunications policy: (1) current "bundling" practices of various
providers is against FCC policy as outlined in a 1992 ruling73 and (2)
locking practices are anticompetitive and akin to the practices
outlawed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the subsequent
FCC ruling on number portability. 74 In 1992 the FCC issued a ruling
that expresses "concern" that customers are not able to choose their
own handsets and service packages and are "forced to buy unwanted
carrier-provided [phones] in order to obtain necessary service ... "75
Thus, the FCC ruling allows carriers to bundle wireless service and
handsets, "provided that service is also offered separately at [sic] a
nondiscriminatory basis."76 The Wireless Alliance comment alleges
that most, if not all wireless companies are in flagrant violation of this
ruling because they do not allow customers to use handsets not
purchased from the provider on the provider's network.7 7 This same
argument has been made in at least one of the lawsuits against
AT&T. 78
The second argument pertaining to U.S. telecommunications
policy is that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which made cell
phone number portability (the ability to keep the same phone number
70. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 3-10.
71. Id. at 3-4, 7.
72. Id. at 4-6, 8-10.
73. Id. at 3-4; see In re Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular
Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 4028, 4028 (Fed. Commc'n Comm'n June 10, 1992) [hereinafter FCC
Bundling Ruling].
74. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 4; see Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (2000); In re Verizon Wireless, 17 F.C.C.R. 14,972, 14,978-81 (2002)
(memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Portability Third Order].
75. FCC Bundling Ruling, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 4.
78. AT&T Complaint, supra note 30, at 8.
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when switching providers) a duty of providers, 79 shows by analogy that
it is the stated policy of the FCC to remove barriers on consumers'
ability to choose wireless service freely. Locked cell phones are an
anticompetitive barrier very similar to the lack of number portability
available prior to 1996.80
In addition to explaining official U.S. telecommunications
policy, the Wireless Alliance comment also discusses relevant cases
clarifying U.S. copyright law.8 1  Foresight Resources Corp. v.
Pfortmiller and Aymes v. Bonelli establish that an owner of a copy of
copyrighted software can make additions or adaptations to the
software or reprogram it in order to make it work for the owner.8 2 The
next three cases involve failed challenges to alleged circumvention
under section 1201; as argued by the comment, however, the opinions
fail to give adequate protection to firmware circumventers because of
the grounds upon which they were decided.8 3
Chamberlain Group Inc. v. Skylink Technologies Inc., a case
involving a manufacturer of "universal" garage-door openers that
mimic the software of other garage-door openers, resulted in a verdict
for the universal opener manufacturer on the narrow grounds that the
plaintiff did not contractually limit its customers to using only the
purchased garage-door openers.8 4 Unfortunately, most, if not all,
wireless providers have contractual provisions that limit customers to
using handsets on one network only.8 5
In a Sixth Circuit case, Lexmark Company lost against a
generic printer cartridge company whose cartridges circumvented a
"secret-handshake" piece of software in order to be compatible with
Lexmark printers on the grounds that Lexmark's copyrighted software
was not an effective control; thus, the defendant's circumvention did
79. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2); In re Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, 8354 (1996) [hereinafter Portability
First Order].
80. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 4.
81. E.g., Chamberlain Group Inc. v. Skylink Techs. Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Lexmark v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); Storage Tech. Corp. v.
Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Aymes v. Bonelli, 47
F.3d 23 (2nd Cir. 1995); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
82. Aymes, 47 F.3d at 26; Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. at 1009. These cases deal with 17 U.S.C.
§ 117, a section allowing adaptation of software as a noninfringing use. See also Wireless
Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 8-9.
83. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 9.
84. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
85. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 9. This is, of course, with the unusual
exception of Verizon, which will soon allow any device meeting minimum standards access to its
network. See infra note 228.
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not violate section 1201.86 No one disputes that the locking techniques
employed by wireless providers are effective controls under section
1201.
Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engraving &
Consulting offers a bit more guidance on section 1201. In this 2004
case, the Federal Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground
that when an independent computer repair company bypassed
security on the servers it was fixing, its actions did not intrude on any
copyrights held by StorageTek, and the use of the software was
noninfringing.87 The court concluded that even though circumvention
under section 1201 did occur in the case, it was not actionable because
the underlying software use was noninfringing.88 This interpretation
of section 1201 might support the argument in favor of cell phone
unlocking. The Wireless Alliance comment concludes that accessing or
modifying firmware to use other networks is clearly noninfringing
under Storage Tech., Pfortmiller, and Aymes.8 9 However, because the
firmware also guards copyrighted ringtones, photos, videos, and
games, and "there is some relationship, though attenuated, between
access controls on the firmware and copyrights, StorageTek may not
protect mobile phone unlockers." 90
In addition to the arguments about environmental and
competitive impact put forth by the Wireless Alliance comment, two
other reply commenters made practical arguments for the proposed
exemption. 91 Mark Crocker, a software engineer who writes code for
mobile devices, argued that his inability to get an unlocked phone cost
his company considerable time and money.92 His company needed to
test its software on a particular phone and could not do so without
unlocking the phone. 93 If phones were unlocked, he argued, it would
"promote the creation of new products for mobile users." This position
often is taken by software engineers writing unauthorized programs
86. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546-47; see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting
circumvention of "a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work") (emphasis
added).
87. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc. (StorageTek), 421
F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88. Id.
89. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 10.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4-6; see also Crocker Reply Comment, supra note 67, at 1-2; Weisman Reply
Comment, supra note 67, at 1-2.
92. Crocker Reply Comment, supra note 67, at 1-2.
93. Id.
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for the iPhone.94 Michael Weisman's reply comment echoes the
complaints of hundreds of iPhone users and an argument made in the
Wireless Alliance comment.95 Weisman explains that travelers need
unlocked phones so they can use their handsets when they travel
abroad. 96 With locked phones, consumers cannot simply buy foreign
SIM cards and minutes for use with their handsets. Instead, they
must either activate their phones (if possible) for global calling, or buy
new handsets and plans in their destination countries, both costly
alternatives.
2. The Register of Copyright's Recommendation
After receiving all of the comments, reply comments, and
testimony, the Register of Copyrights made an eighty-eight page
recommendation on November 17, 2006. 97 This recommendation
examined both the commenting process itself and the merits of the
proposed exemptions. In particular, the recommendation analyzed the
proposed firmware exemption and determined that such an exemption
should be granted.98 The Register narrowed the language of the
exemption proposed by the Wireless Alliance, 99  however; the
exemption is valid only when "circumvention is accomplished for the
sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone
communication network."100 Jennifer Granick, one of the authors of
the Wireless Alliance comment, stated, "But how useful this DMCA
exemption is-I think it's a bit limited-more than I like."101 Indeed,
this narrow language still creates liability under section 1201(a)(2) for
94. Id. at 2; See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Apple to Open iPhone Programming to Outsiders, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at C2.
95. Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 4-5.
96. Weisman Reply Comment, supra note 67, at 1-2. Most regular travelers buy a local SIM
card and wireless minutes for use while abroad and simply switch the SIM cards in their
handsets while abroad. This, of course, requires an unlocked phone.
97. Recommendation from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington,
The Librarian of Congress, regarding Rulemaking on Exemption from Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies (Nov. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201-recommendation.pdf [hereinafter Register
of Copyrights Recommendation].
98. Id. at 48-53.
99. See Wireless Alliance Comment, supra note 5, at 2 (proposing the inclusion of "computer
programs that operate wireless telecommunications handsets. (Mobile firmware)").
100. Register of Copyrights Recommendation, supra note 97, at 53.
101. David Kravets, Ruling Allows Cell Phone Unlocking, but Telco Sues Anyway, WIRED,
Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/08/tracfone?currentPage=all.
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an individual unlocker who publishes a method of unlocking a
phone. 102
The Register's recommendation contains more than just the
suggested exemption, however. Before concluding that an exemption is
warranted, the Register argues (with language later quoted in at least
one complaint filed against Apple and AT&T' 0 3) that unlocking phones
is noninfringing activity.104 The Register writes:
There is no evidence in the record of this rulemaking that demonstrates or even
suggests that obtaining access to the mobile firmware in a mobile handset that is owned
by a consumer is an infringing act. Similarly, there has been no argument or suggestion
that a consumer desiring to switch a lawfully purchased mobile handset from one
network carrier to another is engaging in copyright infringement or in activity that in
any way implicates copyright infringement or the interests of the copyright owner. The
underlying activity sought to be performed by the owner of the handset is to allow the
handset to do what it was manufactured to do - lawfully connect to any carrier. This is a
noninfringing activity by the user. But for the software lock protected by section 1201, it
appears that there would be nothing to stand in the way of a consumer being able to
engage in this noninfringing use of a lawfully purchased mobile handset and the
software that operates it. Indeed, there does not appear to be any concern about
protecting access to the copyrighted work itself. The purpose of the software lock
appears to be limited to restricting the owner's use of the mobile handset to support a
business model, rather than to protect access to a copyrighted work itself.1 0 5
This statement strongly supports the view of unlocking
advocates: accessing mobile firmware for the purpose of changing
networks, not pirating the software, is noninfringing activity, and
when providers lock cell phones, they do so to protect a business
advantage, not copyrighted material.
Finally, it should be noted that when the Register refers to "the
record," she specifically excludes comments from Tracfone Wireless
and the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association ("CTIA")
because, although these industry groups knew about the comment
period and the proposed exemptions, they did not file comments or
replies within the stated deadlines. 0 6 As a result, the official record
for the 2006 Librarian's exemption process does not include
arguments against the proposed firmware exemption because
representatives of the wireless industry, for unknown reasons, failed
to file their comments on time.10 7 As the Register of Copyrights
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000) (making it illegal to "offer to the public" any product or
service that circumvents copyright guards).
103. Complaint at 14, Smith v. Apple, No. 1-07-CV-095781 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County Oct. 5, 2007).
104. Register of Copyrights Recommendation, supra note 97, at 50-53.
105. Id. at 50-51.
106. Id. at 42-48. The CTIA is a wireless industry trade group representing all the major
wireless providers. Its primary purpose is lobbying.
107. Id.
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opined, late filings not only would wreck the process of
decisionmaking, but also would be unfair to those who had filed on
time (and who would not be able to respond to the late comments).108
Perhaps the Librarian's final decision would have been different had
she considered comments from the wireless industry, but given the
Register's strong language, it seems unlikely. Even so, if the
fundamental structure of the U.S. wireless system is the same in 2009
when the next exemption process will occur, it is a safe bet that
wireless companies will make sure their comments are reflected in the
record. 109
C. Congressional Control: Federal Telecommunications Policy
Though the debate over unlocking often centers on copyright
law, it is actually an issue of federal telecommunications policy.
Several FCC and congressional decisions over the years offer key
insights into the goals of U.S. telecommunications policy and the
methods used to meet those goals. This Section focuses on two key
decisions-Carter v. AT&T ("Carterfone") and the FCC's ruling on
wireless number portability-and then provides an overview of recent
hearings and legislation surrounding mobile phone issues.
AT&T's longstanding monopoly was held responsible in large
part for building and maintaining nationwide telephone service. To
that end, it was given broad discretion, including the power to restrict
the kinds of devices consumers could use to connect to the service. 110
Until the 1968 Carterfone decision, telephone companies could restrict
the types of devices used on their networks.111 Consumers were forced,
for the most part, to rent identical phones from the local phone
company. When Thomas Carter built a device that could take a radio
transmission, connect that transmission via a base unit, and make a
telephone call,112 AT&T issued a tariff under existing law to remove
the device from operation and suspend or terminate service to anyone
108. Id. at 47.
109. For an excellent summary of the reactions to the Librarian's 2006 exemption, see Bryan
Gardiner, Carriers Split over Cell-Phone Unlocking, PC MAGAZINE, Dec. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,2069318,00.asp.
110. See Tim Wu, A Brief History of American Telecommunications Regulation, in OXFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.
con/abstract=965860 (describing the monopoly powers and actions of AT&T).
111. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service 13 F.C.C.2d 420
app. A (1968) [hereinafter Carterfone Decision].
112. This allowed consumers to make remote telephone calls; Carter's main customers were
oil rigs. See Kevin Maney, FCC Ruling Changed Phone industry in 1968; It Could Happen Again
Today, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2007, at 3B (discussing Carter's invention).
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using the device. 113 Thomas Carter filed an antitrust action against
AT&T because all local networks were threatening, suspending, or
disconnecting customers using the Carterfone. 114 The Texas district
court passed on the antitrust issues, essentially declaring that the
issues were under the purview of the FCC.115 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed, affirming the lower court's decision on the grounds
that the FCC had "primary jurisdiction" over the issues involved. 1 6
Before any other appeals were made, the FCC held a public hearing to
discuss the issues involved in Carterfone.11 7
In a groundbreaking move, the FCC ruled that AT&T's tariff
that prevented other devices from connecting to their network would
be "unreasonable and unduly discriminatory" in the future and had
been "unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in the past."118 The
FCC had the power to strike down such regulations under the
Communications Act of 1934, which in section 205 specifically
"authorized and empowered" the FCC to "determine and prescribe...
what classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair, and
reasonable, to be thereafter followed ... ."119 In this way, the FCC
decided that customers who wanted to use an interconnecting device
on the phone system would be allowed to do so as long as "the
interconnection does not adversely affect the telephone company's
operations or the telephone system's utility for others.' 2 °
At least a few commentators believe that a new Carterfone-type
decision is needed for the digital age. In a January, 2007, article in
USA Today, journalist Kevin Maney interviewed Chairman Martin of
the FCC about the applicability of the Carterfone decision to modern
113. Carterfone Decision, supra note 111, at 421; Maney, supra note 112. A copy of the tariff
issued by AT&T is attached to the anti-trust case filed by Thomas Carter against AT&T. Carter
v. AT&T, 365 F. 2d 486, 492 n.5 (5th Cir. 1966). In pertinent part, the tariff reads, "In case any
such unauthorized attachment or connection is made, the Telephone Company shall have the
right to remove or disconnect the same; or to suspend the service during the continuance of said
attachment or connection; or to terminate the service." Id.
114. Carter v. AT&T, 250 F. Supp. 188, 189 (N.D. Texas 1966), aff'd, 365 F. 2d 486 (5th Cir.
1966).
115. Carter, 250 F. Supp. at 192 (declaring that the "technical and complex" issues were
within the "special competence and 'expertise' " of the FCC and that any court action might
"disrupt that agency's delicate regulatory scheme and throw existing rate structures out of
balance").
116. Carter, 365 F. 2d at 492.
117. Carterfone Decision, supra note 111, at 421.
118. Id. at 423.
119. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 205 (2000) (amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
120. Carterfone Decision, supra note 111, at 424.
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situations. 121 Writing that "[m]aybe U.S. consumers need another
Carterfone [sic] to bust open the cell phone industry," Maney quotes
the FCC chairman as saying, "There would be some real consumer
savings on the wireless (cellphone) side."'122 The article also quotes
Danny Briere, CEO of Telechoice, 123 and J.P. Auffret, a professor at
George Mason University's business school, who argue that current
"bundling" policies (i.e. the hindrances to switching wireless carriers
and networks being strictly access-controlled) retard innovation and
competition. 24 Maney predicts that "the only way cell phones will get
unbundled from the networks is if the government makes it
happen." 125 He also notes that, although FCC Chairman Martin did
not commit to such an action, the chairman was thinking about it.126
Maney concludes, "As happened after Carterfone [sic], innovation
would doubtlessly flourish."' 27
Less than two weeks after the iPhone went on sale, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet held a hearing
entitled, "Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection."'' 28 Holding
up an iPhone, Chairman Markey introduced the hearing:
Just over a week ago, people stood in line, slept overnight, so that they could get one of
these: an iPhone. The iPhone highlights both the promise and the problems of the
wireless industry today. On the one hand, it demonstrates the sheer brilliance and
wizardry of the new technologies which are available in wireless engineering today ...
But at the same time, the advent of the iPhone raises questions about the fact that a
consumer can't use this phone with other wireless carriers and that consumers, in some
areas of the country, where AT&T doesn't provide service, that they can't use it,
actually, in some neighborhoods at all.
12 9
This hearing, held immediately after the iPhone's release, dealt
with many issues of the wireless industry: early termination fees,
restrictions on innovation, the 2008 UHF spectrum auction 3 °, and
121. Maney, supra note 112, at 3B.
122. Id.
123. Telechoice is a private market analyst firm.
124. Maney, supra note 112, at 3B.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Digital recording: Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet (July 11, 2007), available at http://energycommerce.
edgeboss.net/downloadlenergycommerce/071107.ti.hrg.wireless.wmv [hereinafter Wireless
Innovation and Consumer Protection].
129. Id.
130. The 2008 auction of UHF spectrum came as a result of Congress's mandate that U.S.
television stations switch to digital broadcasting by 2009. The UHF spectrum that had been
used for over-the-air television broadcasting was auctioned off in blocks in early 2008. See
Stephen Labaton, Auction of Wireless Spectrum Brings U.S. $19 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2008, at Cl.
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most importantly, handset locking and device portability. 131 The
subcommittee even touched on the possibility that a new Carterfone
doctrine should be applied to today's wireless market. 1 2 One witness
especially, Professor Timothy Wu, focused on consumer issues in the
modern wireless marketplace. 33 Elsewhere, Professor Wu also has
called for a new "Wireless Carterfone" doctrine.' 34 Professor Wu
opined,
You know, imagine the situation where if you bought a television set, it had cable
service, you decide, "I'm done with cable; I'm moving to satellite," next thing you know
your ... television stopped working. Now, that would be completely unacceptable. When
people buy a television, they think, "This is my television; I own it. If I want to move to
broadcast, fine. If I want to move to cable: fine, satellite: fine. This is my property, I do
with it what I want." Telephones are nothing like that. They are locked to carriers, they
are disabled from switching, and it is a situation which has become unacceptable, and
will become increasingly unacceptable when we see companies like Apple trying to enter
this market, but being forced to be hamstrung and disable their devices from the full
kind of compatibility that they should have. And so ... the point of Wireless Carterfone
is addressing these issues. And the most important rule for addressing these issues is
rules against locking and rules against blocking. Device portability must be allowed, and
these phone companies should not be allowed to block applications that people want to
use.135
Given the testimony of Professor Wu and the comments of
several members of the subcommittee, including the chairman, it is
fair to say that the consumer issues of handset locking and device
portability are on Congress's radar. Indeed, consciousness of these
issues, due in part to the introduction of the iPhone and the furor it
caused, may be provoking Congress and the FCC to take action.
Indeed, this hearing is not the only time in which Congress and the
FCC have taken action to protect consumers and open up competition
in the telecommunications marketplace.
The FCC's 1996 Ruling on Number Portability and its later
orders applying that decision to wireless carriers promoted openness,
competition, and innovation much the same way the Carterfone
decision did. 36 In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress
passed the first major revision of U.S. telecommunications policy in
over sixty years. 37 Included in the Act are provisions designed to
facilitate competition, deregulation, and consumer choice by requiring
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 389, 415-17 (2007).
135. Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection, supra note 128.
136. Portability First Order, supra note 79, at 8377; Portability Third Order, supra note 74,
at 14,972.
137. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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all local telephone service operators to allow number portability. 138
These provisions were designed to lower barriers to switching carriers
since "the ability to change service providers is only meaningful if a
customer can retain his or her local telephone number." 139
The Act originally required providers to comply by June 30,
1999; however, several extensions and challenges delayed the
implementation of number portability for wireless carriers until
November 24, 2003.140 Not surprisingly, the CTIA and wireless
companies fought these rules tooth and nail14' because refusing to
offer customers number portability was one way wireless providers
maintained subscribers and market share. 142 In spite of these
companies' efforts, and after numerous FCC decisions and at least one
appellate opinion, 143 number portability for wireless carriers became a
reality. 144 Motivated as they were to "provide consumers greater
choices and better quality in their telephone, cable, and information
services," Congress and the President were delighted when number
portability became a reality for the nation's rapidly growing wireless
network. 145
The current Congress has not proposed a solution that would
ameliorate the effects of handset locking. Senate Bill 2033, the
Cellphone Consumer Empowerment Act of 2007, takes action against
early termination fees and adhesive contracts but only calls for a
study by the FCC analyzing:
(1) the practice in the United States of handset locking;
138. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2). Number portability is the ability to keep one's phone number
when switching carriers. For the exact definition of "number portability" as supplied by the Act,
see 47 U.S.C. § 153(30). The FCC also initiated a feasibility study for number portability and
issued its rules and regulations implementing the law. See Portability First Order, supra note
79, at 8354-55.
139. Portability First Order, supra note 79, at 8354 n.8.
140. Portability Third Order supra note 74, at 14,987; Telephone Number Portability, 62
Fed. Reg. 18,280, 18,295 (Apr. 15, 1997) (amending 47 C.F.R. § 52.23). For an excellent summary
of the implementation of wireless number portability, see Stephen M. Kessing, Note, Wireless
Local Number Portability: New Rules Will have Broad Effects, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6.
141. After losing, however, at least some carriers publicly embraced the change. See, e.g.,
Matt Richtel, In a Reversal, Verizon Backs Rule to Keep Cell Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2003, at C1.
142. See, e.g., Mike Musgrove, Cell Users Can Keep Numbers; Court Affirms FCC Rule,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at El (explaining how a federal court decision requiring number
portability affects both providers and consumers); Richtel, supra note 141, at C1 (describing
some providers' concerns with number portability).
143. Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Ass'n v. FCC, 330 F.3d 502, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
144. See generally Kessing, supra note 140; Musgrove, supra note 142; Richtel, supra note
141.
145. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 188 (Feb. 8,
1996).
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(2) the practice of handset portability in European and Asian markets;
(3) the effects on competition and the effect of consumer behavior, of the practices
described in (1) and (2); and
(4) potential methods of regulating handset locking and portability in the United
States."
14 6
Although an insightful report would be a step in the right
direction, the bill seems destined to die in committee. 147 The only other
piece of legislation applicable to the situation is the Digital Media
Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, which called for an amendment to
section 1201(c)(1): "[I]t is not a violation of this section to circumvent a
technological measure in order to obtain access to the work for
purposes of making noninfringing use of the work." 148 This bill has
already died in committee.
Given the conclusion of the Register of Copyrights that "[t]he
purpose of the software lock appears to be limited to restricting the
owner's use of the mobile handset to support a business model"
instead of actually protecting copyrighted material, 149 the cell phone
locking question may yet be governed by existing or future
telecommunications policy instead of the arcane machinations of
copyright law. Because the FCC and Congress have failed to address
the locking issue, however, both consumers and corporations are
pursuing the issue vigorously in venues across the United States.
III. HANDSET LOCKING LITIGATION
Consumers and corporations began litigating the issues
surrounding handset locking long before the Librarian's controversial
anticircumvention exemption, and have continued to do so afterwards.
On the one hand, consumers such as iPhone purchasers have come to
expect complete ownership of the handsets they buy and freedom to
choose the networks they use. These consumers see the practices of
wireless providers as unfair and unjust. On the other hand, wireless
providers and handset makers, especially Apple, want to protect their
copyrighted firmware and maintain the profitability of the wireless
business. Part A will detail consumers' lawsuits against and
146. The Cell Phone Consumer Empowerment Act of 2007, S. 2033, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007).
147. Id. The last major congressional action relating to the bill was on October 17, 2007.
THOMAS, The Library of Congress, S. 2033 - All Congressional Actions, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-binlbdquery/z?dllO:s.02033: (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
148. The Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).
149. Register of Copyrights Recommendation, supra note 97, at 50-51.
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settlements with wireless providers, and Part B will examine
corporate lawsuits against cell phone unlockers.
A. Free My Phone!
The problem with the iPhone is that the iPhone with AT&T
is kind of a "Hotel California" service: you can check out
anytime you like, but you can never leave.
- Congressman Edward Markey, July 11, 2007150
Given the rapid proliferation of cell phones in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, lawsuits arose regarding
cell phone service, fees, contracts, and handset locks. 151 Even before
the Librarian passed the anticircumvention exemption with respect to
cell phones, consumers and corporations initiated a wave of handset
locking litigation.152 Consumers filed suit primarily in California
because of the broadly construed consumer protection and unfair
business practice laws in that state, including the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA") and the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). 153
These suits named as defendants the five major wireless carriers:
Sprint, AT&T, Cingular, Verizon, and T-Mobile. 154
Consumers filed suit against these carriers as early as 2003,
three years before the Librarian's exemption. 155 Many of these
lawsuits complained of unfair termination fee practices or
unconscionable contract clauses.1 56 A handful of lawsuits filed in
150. Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection, supra note 128.
151. See supra note 30.
152. See supra Part II; Tracfone v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2007);
Complaint at 1, Mendoza v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. RG03114152 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda
County Nov. 24, 2003); Sprint Complaint, supra note 30, at 2; AT&T Complaint, supra note 30,
at 1-2.
153. Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West 2008); Unfair
Competition Law, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-10 (West 2008).
154. Complaint at 1, Nguyen v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. RG04139536 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Alameda County Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Nguyen 1 1; Complaint at 2, Advanced Systems
Integration, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, No. RG04137703 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb.
27, 2004); Complaint at 1, Mendoza v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. RG03114152 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Alameda County Nov. 24, 2003); Sprint Complaint, supra note 30, at 2; AT&T Complaint, supra
note 30, at 1-2; Verizon Complaint, supra note 31, at 2.
155. See supra note 152.
156. See Rel v. Cingular Wireless, No. RG05223276 (Alameda County Super. Ct. filed July
18, 2005); Salas v. AT&T Corp, No. RG04140397, (Alameda County Super. Ct. filed Feb. 9, 2004);
Cherrigan v. AT&T Corp., No. RG03132892 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County filed Dec. 19,
2003); Lyons v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. RG03114214 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County filed
Aug. 23, 2003); Marlowe v. AT&T Corp., No. RG03108118 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County filed
July 23, 2003); Tucker v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. 03CC09437 (Orange County Super. Ct.
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California between March 12, 2003, and February 3, 2004, directly
challenged the carriers ' 157 policies against handset unlocking158 under
the California Civil Code and the California Business and Professions
Code.159
Today, these cases are part of a coordinated set of cases in
California state court known as the Cellphone Termination Fee
Cases.160 Although the cases deal with various issues, several of them
involve wireless providers who were sued specifically over their
handset locking practices. Through the Cellphone Termination Fee
Cases, California likely will forge new rules of interaction between
consumers and wireless providers. The first stop on the road to
settlement or trial in many of these cases has been litigation over
motions to compel arbitration.
Most, if not all, wireless contracts include clauses in which
customers agree to arbitrate disputes. 161 Thus, when the plaintiffs in
filed July 23, 2003); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, No. 03CC09028 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange
County filed July 10, 2003); Parrish v. Nextel Commc'ns, No. 03CC09021 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange
County filed July 10, 2003); Parrish v. Sprint PCS, No. 03CC09022 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange
County filed July 10, 2003); Wireless Consumers Alliance v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No.
RG03097749 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County filed May 22, 2003).
157. These included Sprint, AT&T, Cingular, Verizon (doing business as Cellco), and T-
Mobile.
158. See supra note 154. According to USA Today, these five (now four) wireless providers
represent 88.1% of the wireless market. Cauley, supra note 10, at lB.
159. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a)(5)-(7), (9), (14), (19) (West 2008); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
16720, 16727, 17200-17210 (West 2008).
160. See Order Following Oct. 22, 2003 Case Management Conference, Cellphone
Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Dec. 23, 2003) (coordinating
Meoli, Parrish v. Cingular Wireless LLC, Parrish v. Nextel Communications, Inc., Parrish v.
Sprint PCS, Marlowe v. AT&T Wireless, Inc., Mendoza, Zill, and Lyons v. Nextel
Communications, Inc. into Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4332 (Cellphone
Termination Fee Cases)); see Order of Mar. 5, 2004, Nguyen II, No. RG04139536 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Alameda County Mar. 5, 2004) (coordinating Nguyen 11 into the Cellphone Termination Fee
Cases); Order of Feb. 27, 2004, Advanced Systems Integration, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, No.
RG04137703 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 27, 2004) (coordinating Advanced Systems
Integration into the Cellphone Termination Fee Cases); Order of Feb. 27, 2004, Nguyen v. Cellco
Partnership, No. RG04137699 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 27, 2004) (coordinating
Nguyen into the Cellphone Termination Fee Cases); see also Minutes of Case Management
Conference, Nov. 24, 2003, Mendoza v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. RG03114152 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Alameda County Nov. 24, 2003) (coordinating Mendoza into the Cellphone Termination Fee
Cases); Minutes of Case Management Conference, Oct. 22, 2003, Meoli v. Viva Wireless, No.
RG03086113 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 7, 2003) (coordinating Meoli into the
Cellphone Termination Fee Cases); Minutes of Case Management Conference, Oct. 22, 2003, Zill
v. Sprint Spectrum Ltd. P'ship, No. RG03114147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 7, 2003)
(coordinating Zill into the Cellphone Termination Fee Cases).
161. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration at 3-7, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County
July 15, 2005) (detailing T-Mobile's arbitration clauses and arguments); Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendant Cingular to Compel Arbitration at 4-5,
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the handset unlocking cases (a subset of the Cellphone Termination
Fee Cases) filed suit, service providers moved to compel arbitration. 162
Consumers have been successful in fending off these challenges.
AT&T's motion to compel arbitration was denied and the clause
compelling arbitration and banning class actions was struck down as
unconscionable by the California Court of Appeals on September 30,
2005.163 The U.S. Supreme Court denied AT&T's petition for certiorari
on June 19, 2006, letting the lower court's decision stand.164 Similarly,
a California Court of Appeals denied Cingular's motion to compel
arbitration and declared arbitration provisions in customer contracts
unconscionable on October 3, 2005.165 The U.S. Supreme Court denied
Cingular certiorari on June 5, 2006.166 On June 22, 2007, a California
Court of Appeals struck down T-Mobile's contract provisions as
unconscionable and denied T-Mobile's motion to compel arbitration. 167
This time, the California Supreme Court denied review, letting the
appellate court's decision stand. 168 Since clearing these hurdles, the
lawsuits have moved forward.
Though they were filed against different providers, all six
complaints allege similar abuses with identical bases for recovery.
Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., the first suit filed, is a class
action embodying all of the issues involved in the five subsequent
cases. 169 The most recent amended complaint claims that AT&T
makes material representations that special software is needed to
make a phone work with AT&T's service. 170 The complaint alleges that
Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 4, 2003)
(detailing Cingular's arbitration clauses and arguments); Notice of and Petition and Motion For
Order Compelling Arbitration at 2-6, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Alameda County Nov. 4, 2003) (detailing AT&T's arbitration clauses and arguments).
162. Notice of Motion and Petition and Motion and Petition of Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc.
to Compel Arbitration, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda
County July 15, 2005); Notice of Motion and Motion of Cingular to Compel Arbitration,
Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 4, 2003);
Order, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County July. 1,
2003).
163. Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 2005 WL 2404427, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.-1st Sept. 30,
2005).
164. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. v. Meoli, 547 U.S. 1206, 1206 (2006).
165. Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., 2005 WL 2420719, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.-1st Nov. 2,
2005).
166. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C. v. Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188, 1188 (2006).
167. Gatton v. T-Mobile, USA, 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 588 (Cal. Ct. App.-4th 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 2501 (2008).
168. Kravets, supra note 33.
169. AT&T Complaint, supra note 30, at 1, 4-7. Because the Meoli complaint contains all of
the legal arguments of the other subsequent complaints, it will serve as the basis for discussion.
170. Id. at 7.
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AT&T materially misrepresents the condition of the phones it sells as
new and unaltered, and its packaging misleads consumers to believe
that the phones are compatible with other networks. 171 The complaint
further alleges that AT&T makes these misrepresentations to conceal
that AT&T locks its handsets, that the handsets work with other
carriers' services, that the only limits on use are put in place
deliberately and systematically by AT&T, and that handsets can be
unlocked simply in a matter of seconds. 172
Essentially, Meoli contends that AT&T cripples the phones it
sells, untruthfully passes the phones off as new, hides the changes
from consumers, misleads consumers into believing that phones
cannot be used on other networks, and refuses to restore the
phones. 173 The harms that Meoli claims for herself and her class are
numerous: she claims that the AT&T handsets are of diminished
value and that the class members are discouraged from switching
carriers, may incur costs to unlock phones, and may lose the use of
their phones if they switch carriers. 174 The complaint bases its
arguments on two crucial parts of California code: California Civil
Code section 1770 and California Business and Professions Code
sections 16720, 16727, and 17200 to 17210.175
California Civil Code section 1770 is part of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, passed in 1970.176 The Meoli complaint lists six
subsections that it claims AT&T violated:
(a)(5), representing goods as having qualities that they do not have;
(a)(6), representing deteriorated or altered goods as new;
(a)(7), representing goods as a particular standard, quality, or grade if they are not so;
(a)(9), advertising goods intending not to sell them as advertised;
(a)(14), representing a transaction as including rights, remedies, or obligations which
the transaction lacks (or which are illegal); and
(a)(19), inserting an unconscionable provision in a contract. 17 7
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 4-9.
174. Id. at 9.
175. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a)(5)-(7), (9), (14), (19) (West 2008); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
16720, 16727, 17200-17210 (West 2008).
176. Consumer Legal Remedies Act, 1970 Cal. Stat. 3157.
177. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a)(5}-(7), (9), (14), (19) (West 2008).
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In addition, the complaint alleges that AT&T violated sections
17200, 16720 and 16727 of the California Business and Professions
Code. 178 In 1933, the state legislature added section 17200, better
known as the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") to the Business and
Professions Code. 179 The UCL enjoins corporations and people and
holds them liable for unfair competition, which is defined in section
17200 as "any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising. .,,0
Counts 1, 11, and III of the Meoli complaint allege that AT&T is subject
to and violated the fraudulent, unlawful, and unfair prongs of the
UCL, respectively. 181
Finally, the complaint alleges in Count II that AT&T violated
the UCL's "unlawful" prong by conspiring with other Providers to
restrict trade by locking handsets in violation of Business and
Professions Code section 16720 and unlawfully tying together wireless
handsets and services in violation of section 16727.182 It also alleges
that AT&T ran afoul of the UCL's "unlawful" prong by violating 15
U.S.C. section 45, which gives the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
power to declare that certain actions are "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts."1 83 Lastly, the complaint
alleges that AT&T violated the UCL's "unlawful" prong by failing to
honor the FCC bundling rule, which states that in order to offer
cellular service bundled with a phone, a company must also offer
cellular service independently on a nondiscriminatory basis.1 84 The
complaint alleges that AT&T does not offer service unbundled from a
phone. 185
Taken together, this litany of complaints against AT&T seems
persuasive. However, Meoli has neither settled nor gone to trial,
178. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720, 16727, 17200-17210 (West 2008).
179. See Mark A. Chavez & Kim E. Card, California's Unfair Competition Law-The
Structure and Use of Business and Professions Code § 17200, 1532 PLI/CORP 43, 43-69 (2006)
(explaining the history, use, and structure of the UCL).
180. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
181. AT&T Complaint, supra note 30, at 13-18. "Fraudulent" claims are in paragraphs 60-
61; "unlawful" claims are in paragraphs 64-71; and "unfair" claims are in paragraphs 74-81.
182. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720, 16727 (West 2008) (defining "trusts" and making it
illegal to sell goods with the agreement that the purchaser will refrain from using a competitor's
goods, respectively). The complaint is alleging, by implication, that AT&T has violated California
Business and Professional Code section 16726, which holds that "[e]xcept as provided in this
chapter, every trust is unlawful, against public policy and void." Id. § 16726.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
184. FCC Bundling Ruling, supra note 73, 6.
185. AT&T Complaint, supra note 30, at 18.
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although several similar and related cases have settled.18 6 These
settlements could be harbingers of things to come for AT&T and T-
Mobile. Verizon settled both of its handset locking suits on June 11,
2007.187 In the settlement agreement, Verizon agreed to a twenty-four
month injunction during which it would set the software lock code to
the default.188 This setting allows consumers to unlock their phones
easily for use on another network. Verizon also agreed to insert
clauses into user manuals and customer-service manuals, and to
disseminate information to retail stores about unlocking phones and
the use of unlocked phones on Verizon's network.18 9
Not long after Verizon settled its handset-locking lawsuits,
Sprint settled a suit of its own, much to the media's acclaim.1 90 As part
of the settlement, Sprint agreed to provide unlocking codes to
customers, provided that they can authenticate their accounts and are
not in default of any payment, have closed accounts, or have pre-pay,
global, or iDEN phones. 191 Additionally, Sprint promised to inform its
customer service representatives and retail outlets of the change and
to update its owner's manuals. 192 Finally, Sprint agreed to allow other
approved devices on its network.193
The Sprint settlement was hailed by the press as signaling "the
start of more flexibility for cellphone customers switching carriers."
194
Indeed, the Verizon and Sprint settlements, along with the decisions
186. Complaint, Advanced Systems Integration, Inc. v. Cellco Partnership, No. RG04137703
(Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 27, 2004); Sprint Complaint, supra note 30; Verizon
Complaint, supra note 31.
187. Final Approval Order and Judgment, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Alameda County June 12, 2007); Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, Cellphone
Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter
Verizon Settlement Agreement] (settling both Nguyen v. Cellco and Advanced Systems
Integration v. Cellco).
188. Verizon Settlement Agreement, supra note 187, at 8 (excluding pre-pay and Global
phones). This lock code is known as an SPC code and the default setting is either 000000 or
123456.
189. Id. at 8-9.
190. Order Continuing Hearing on Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Regarding
Sprint Handset Locking Claims at 1, Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Alameda
County Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2007). Sprint is still litigating over attorneys fees, but the substance
of the agreement has been formally approved. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, Cellphone
Termination Fee Cases, No. 4332 (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County June 28, 2007) [hereinafter
Sprint Settlement Agreement] (settling Zill v. Sprint Spectrum); see also Katie Hafner, Sprint
Nextel Settles Lawsuit Over Switching to New Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at C4
(describing the general terms of Sprint Nextel's settlement agreement).
191. Sprint Settlement Agreement, supra note 190, at 9.
192. Id. at 9-10.
193. Id.
194. Hafner, supra note 190, at C4.
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denying orders to compel arbitration in the AT&T, Cingular, and T-
Mobile cases, all point toward a trend among wireless providers to
offer open networks and unlock phones quickly and more frequently.195
As portentous as the settlements may be, the November 27, 2007,
announcement that Verizon planned to open up its wireless network
to "[a]ny device that meets the minimum technical standard" required
to access the network is just as telling. 196 Verizon's openness and the
Verizon and Sprint settlements signal a change in the wireless model
that likely will end with providers selling unlocked phones or
unlocking them after a short time, thereby allowing most phones and
devices to access their networks. These changes would save consumers
the cost of purchasing new cell phones, would encourage innovation by
handset and device manufacturers by decoupling device sales from
wireless access sales, and would spur increased competition among
the wireless carriers, leading to better service and prices for
consumers.
While the Verizon and Sprint settlements are a positive sign of
things to come, these agreements are not solutions to the problem of
unlocking: they are too limited in scope. Although it purports to
unlock its phones, Sprint still has multiple conditions that must be
met before phones are unlocked. 97 Moreover, both settlements have
many exemptions. 98 It is clear that, though the settlements are a
positive first step, a larger and more comprehensive solution is needed
to protect consumers.
In addition to the Celiphone Termination Fee Cases, at least
two lawsuits arose soon after the introduction of the iPhone that
specifically relate to that product. 199 Both cases are class actions and
rely on many of the same grounds as the other handset locking
195. Gatton v. T-Mobile, 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 577-78 (Cal. Ct. App.-4th 2007), cert. denied,
128 S.Ct. 2501, 2501 (2008); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, 2005 WL 2420719, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App.-lst, Oct. 3, 2005), cert. denied, Cingular Wireless, LLC, v. Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188, 1188
(2006); Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Servs, Inc., 2005 WL 2404427, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.-lst, Sept. 30,
2005), cert. denied, New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. v. Meoli, 547 U.S. 1206, 1206 (2006).
196. Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Verizon Wireless To Introduce 'Any Apps, Any Device'
Option For Customers In 2008 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://news.vzw.com/news/2007/11/
pr2007-11-27.html; see also Kim Hart, Verizon To Open Its Wireless Network; Move Gives Users
Increased Choices, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2007, at DI (discussing Verizon's decision to open its
network).
197. Sprint Settlement Agreement, supra note 190, at 8-9.
198. Id. at 9; Verizon Settlement Agreement, supra note 187, at 8.
199. Complaint at 1, Holman v. Apple, No. C0705152 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007); Complaint at
1, Smith v. Apple, No. 1-07-CV-095781 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Oct. 5, 2007).
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cases.200 In addition, the lawsuits allege antitrust violations and
breaches of the Computer Fraud Abuse Act as a result of some
unlocked iPhones being "bricked. '20 1
B. Copyright, Trademark, and Contract Violations: The Wireless
Industry Responds
A short time after consumers filed lawsuits in California,
corporations such as Tracfone Wireless, Nokia, and Virgin Mobile
successfully sued individuals and companies that unlocked and resold
cell phones. 20 2 Although these lawsuits were argued all over the
United States, they were concentrated in Florida, Texas, and
California. 2 3 As a corporate plaintiff, Tracfone sued unlockers on the
200. Complaint at 17-24, Holman v. Apple, No. C0705152 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007);
Complaint at 39-52, Smith v. Apple, No. 1-07-CV-095781 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County
Oct. 5, 2007).
201. See supra note 200 (alleging violations of the Computer Fraud Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (2000)). "Bricking" is when products, iPhones in this case, become disabled because of
modifications or, here, a software update sent out by Apple. In some cases, the phones become
irreversibly disabled and about as useful as a brick. Douglas Adams presciently wrote of the
concept of a "bricked" computer in his 1987 novel, Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency:
"Well, you're absolutely right, officer. The thing is hopeless. It's the
major reason the original company went bust. I suggest you use it as a big
paperweight."
'"Well, I wouldn't like to do that, sir," the policeman persisted. "The door
would keep blowing open."
"What do you mean, officer?" asked Richard.
"I use it to keep the door closed, sir. Nasty draughts down our station
this time of year. In the summer, of course, we beat suspects round the head
with it."
DOUGLAS ADAMS, DIRK GENTLY'S HOLISTIC DETECTIVE AGENCY 101 (1987).
202. Tracfone v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Tracfone v. Pan Ocean
Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 27, 2007); Nokia v. Sol Wireless, No.
1:06-cv-20011-CMA (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 3, 2006); Tracfone v. Sol Wireless, No. 05-23279 (S.D.
Fla. filed Dec. 21, 2005). It should also be noted that Tracfone sued the Librarian of Congress
after he issued the 2006 exemption. Complaint at 1, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. James H.
Billington, Librarian of Congress and Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, No. 1:06-cv-
22942-DLG (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2006). The case was dropped on June 1, 2007. Stipulation of
Dismissal, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress and Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights, No. 1:06-cv-22942-DLG (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2007).
203. See Tracfone v. Brooks, No. 3:07-cv-02033 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 5, 2007); Tracfone v.
Carson, No. 3:07-cv-01761 (N.D. Tex filed Oct. 18, 2007); Tracfone v. Tayob, No. 1:07-cv-21227-
AJ (S.D. Fla. filed May 10, 2007); Tracfone v. Iser, No. 1:07-cv-20429-PCH (S.D. Fla. filed Feb.
16, 2007); Tracfone v. Lalany, No. 1:07-cv-20430-ASG (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 16, 2007); Tracfone v.
Riedeman, No. 6:06-cv-01257-GKS-UAM (M.D. Fla. filed Aug. 23, 2006). Nokia also successfully
sued for injunctions against Sol Wireless and Pan Ocean Communications, a fact that Tracfone
points out in its later complaints. Nokia v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-CMA (S.D.
Fla. filed Dec. 27, 2007); Nokia v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:06-cv-20011-CMA (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 3,
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basis of section 1201,204 making these suits particularly important to
the issues of cell phone unlocking under the DMCA.205
After filing only three such lawsuits in 2005 and 2006,206
Tracfone Wireless went on the warpath, filing at least twenty federal
lawsuits directed at cell phone unlockers in 2007.207 These later suits
were predicated on the company's success in three crucial early
lawsuits: Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, Tracfone Wireless,
Inc. v. Pan Ocean Communications, and Virgin Mobile v. Iser.208 All
2006). See, e.g., Complaint at 10, Tracfone v. Lalany, No. 1:07-cv-20430-ASG (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16,
2007) (pointing out that Nokia successfully obtained injunctions).
204. Tracfone v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Tracfone v. Sol
Wireless, No. 05-23279 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 21, 2005).
205. Virgin Mobile has been suing cell phone resellers for years, but although it has
successfully won injunctions in perhaps every lawsuit it tries, these suits offer less guidance to
cell phone unlocking law than those of Tracfone. See Complaint at 13-14 n.1, Virgin Mobile v.
Blue Oceans Distrib., No. 1:06-cv-00511-EJL (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 2006) (naming at least eleven
cases in eight different states where Virgin Mobile has won injunctive relief from resellers). This
is because Virgin Mobile does not file suit on the basis of section 1201. Several of the suits
mention the section, but since it is not a basis on which claims are based, courts do not rule on
the applicability of section 1201 to unlockers. See Complaint at 12-13, 17-18, Virgin Mobile v.
Iser, No. 06-CV-0434-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2006) (mentioning section 1201 in several
paragraphs but not as the direct basis for a claim); Complaint at 11, 14, 17, Virgin Mobile v.
World MMP, No. 4:06-cv-024 (S.D. Tex. July 24, 2006) (mentioning section 1201 in several
paragraphs but not as the direct basis for a claim).
206. Complaint, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Riedeman, No. 6:06-cv-01257-GKS-UAM (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 23, 2006); Complaint, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-
61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2005); Complaint, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No.
1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2005).
207. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Miranda Holdings, No. 1:07-cv-23348-MGC (S.D. Fla. filed
Dec. 21, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Platform Enter., No. 8:07-cv-01460-AG-MLG (C.D. Cal
filed Dec. 20, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. GCA Elecs., No. 1:07-cv-03084-TCB (N.D. Ga. filed
Dec. 12, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Brooks, No. 3:07-cv-02033 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 5, 2007);
Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. GSM Group, No. 1:07-cv-23166-JEM (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 5, 2007);
Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Loochan, No. 3:07-cv-01771 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 5, 2007); Tracfone
Wireless, Inc. v. Stone, No. 3:07-cv-01770 (N.D. Tex. filed Oct. 22, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc.
v. Carson, No. 3:07-cv-01761 (N.D. Tex filed Oct. 18, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Haifa, No.
5:07-cv-01355-SGL-JCR (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 15, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Glow
International, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-22354-JLK (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 7, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc.
v. Thomas, No. 3:07-cv-01495 (N.D. Tex. filed Sept. 4, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Bitcell
Corp., No. 1:07-cv-22249-PAS (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 28, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Chothai,
No. 1:07-cv-22216-PA (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 23, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Singh, No. 1:07-
cv-22202-PCH (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 22, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Mubashir, No. 4:07-cv-
02206 (S.D. Tex. filed July 6, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Gasboy Texas, No. 1:07-cv-21243-
JLK (S.D. Fla. filed May 11, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Tayob, No. 1:07-cv-21227-AJ (S.D.
Fla. filed May 10, 2007); Complaint, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Iser, No. 1:07-cv-20429-PCH (S.D.
Fla. filed Feb. 16, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Lalany, No. 1:07-cv-20430-ASG (S.D. Fla. filed
Feb. 16, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, No. 6:2007cv00013 (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 5, 2007).
208. Complaint at 1, Virgin Mobile v. Iser, No. 06-CV-0434-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. Aug. 23,
2006); Complaint at 10-12, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-
CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2005); Complaint at 10-12, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No.
1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2005); see Complaint at 10-12, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v.
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three lawsuits resulted in final judgments and permanent injunctions
against cell phone unlockers. 20 9 Because of the strength of these
victories, Tracfone settled at least seven of its 2007 lawsuits less than
a year after they were filed.210
Sol Wireless and Pan Ocean Communications, suits filed less
than a week apart, allege that the defendants bought Tracfone
Wireless prepaid phones in bulk, removed them from the packaging,
modified or erased the firmware so as to unlock the phones and
disable them from reaching the Tracfone network, and resold them in
different, Nokia-branded packaging. 211 Tracfone sued the respective
defendants for federal trademark violations, unfair business
practices, 21 2 and (most importantly) violations of section 1201 of the
DMCA.213 Tracfone alleged both illegal circumvention of a technology
designed to protect a copyrighted work and trafficking in the service
by providing the product of illegal circumvention to the public.214
Thus, when District Judge Altonaga entered final judgments and
permanent injunctions against Sol Wireless on February 27th, 2006,
and Pan Ocean Communications on August 7th, 2006, she specifically
Iser, No. 1:07-cv-20429-PCH (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2007) (detailing other cases on cell phone locking
resolved against unlockers, resulting in permanent injunctions).
209. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction on Consent, Virgin Mobile v. Iser, No. 06-
CV-0434-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2006); Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction,
Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2006);
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:05-cv-
23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2006).
210. Tracfone v. Mubashir, No. 4:07-cv-02206 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2007); Tracfone v. Gasboy
Texas, No. 1:07-cv-21243-JLK (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2007); Tracfone v. Tayob, No. 1:07-cv-21227-AJ
(S.D. Fla. May 10, 2007); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Iser, No. 1:07-cv-20429-PCH (S.D. Fla. Feb.
16, 2007); Tracfone v. Lalany, No. 1:07-cv-20430-ASG (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2007); Tracfone v.
Dixon, No. 6:2007cv00013 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2007); Tracfone v. Billington, No. 1:2006cv22942
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2006).
211. Complaint at 4-5, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-
CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2005); Complaint at 4-5, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No.
1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2005).
212. See Complaint at 5-9, 12-14, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-
cv-61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2005) (alleging federal trademark infringement, federal unfair
competition, "injury to business reputation and dilution of mark," unfair competition and
"deceptive trade practices," "tortious interference with business relationships and prospective
advantage," and "tortious interference with the business relationship between Tracfone and
Nokia"); Complaint at 5-10, 12-14, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:05-cv-23279-
CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2005) (same).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (2) (2000).
214. Complaint at 10-12, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-
CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2005); Complaint at 10-12, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No.
1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2005); see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (2).
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interpreted the strictures of sections 1201(a)(1)-(2) against cell phone
unlockers. 215
The injunctions prohibit the defendants from "engaging in the
alteration or unlocking of any TracFone phones" or "facilitating or in
any way assisting" others who the defendants know, or should have
known, are "engaged in altering or unlocking any TracFone phone."216
Similarly, in the Virgin Mobile suits, the injunctions bar the
defendants from "tampering with, altering, erasing, disabling, or
otherwise modifying the software" 217  or "tampering with the
software"218 of Virgin Mobile phones or "inducing or soliciting" others
to do so. 21 9
Likely based on the success of these early suits, 220 the
remainder of Tracfone's lawsuits include actions based on sections
1201(a)(1)-(2). 221 In the only published case of the Tracfone series,
Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, a Florida district court judge
evaluated the claims under sections 1201(a)(1)-(2) and found
specifically that the November 2006 exemption by the Librarian of
Congress did not apply.222 As he stated,
The Court finds that this new exemption does not absolve the Defendants of liability for
their violations of the DMCA as alleged in Counts III and IV of TracFone's Complaint,
because the Defendants' conduct as alleged in this case does not come within the scope
of the new exemption. The Defendants' misconduct and involvement in unlocking
215. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean
Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2006); Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28,
2006).
216. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 3, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Pan Ocean
Commc'ns, No. 0:05-cv-61956-CMA (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2006); Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction at 3, Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:05-cv-23279-CMA (S.D. Fla. Feb.
28, 2006).
217. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction on Consent at 2, Virgin Mobile v. Iser, No.
06-CV-0434-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2006).
218. Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent Injunction at 2, Virgin Mobile v. World MMP,
Inc., No. 4:06-cv-02444 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2006).
219. Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction on Consent at 2, Virgin Mobile v. Iser, No.
06-CV-0434-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2006); Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent
Injunction at 2, Virgin Mobile v. World MMP, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-02444 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2006).
220. See Kravets, supra note 101 (quoting James Baldinger, Tracfone's attorney as saying,
"[W]e've been running all over the country, finding these criminals and when we can, suing
them. We've had tremendous success.").
221. The suits include claims of circumvention of technological measures that control access
to copyrighted software and trafficking in services that circumvent technological measures
protecting copyrighted software. See, e.g., Complaint at 31-34, Tracfone v. Platform Enter., No.
8:07-cv-01460-AG-MLG (C.D. Cal, Dec. 20, 2007); Complaint at 17-20, Tracfone v. Mubashir, No.
4:07-cv-02206 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2007); Complaint at 15-18, Tracfone v. Gasboy Texas, No. 1:07-
cv-21243-JLK (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2007).
222. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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TracFone handsets was for the purpose of reselling those handsets for a profit, and not
'for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communication
network."' Because the exemption does not apply to the conduct alleged in this case,
there is no need for the Court to address the validity of the exemption or the
circumstances surrounding its enactment.
2 2 3
This likely was welcome news to Tracfone, whose attorney said,
"We were concerned that the decision was susceptible to an
interpretation that would allow criminals to use that exemption as a
shield to avoid civil liability. '224
It seems on the basis of Dixon that the Librarian's exemption
has no real teeth. 225 Though it means to allow consumers to unlock cell
phones and use them on other networks, the decision by the Dixon
court declines to extend that exemption in a way that protects those
who actually perform the unlocking. 226 The fact that Tracfone
specifically sued resellers makes the legal situation even murkier; the
provider has not yet sued a company or individual that takes
customers' existing cell phones and unlocks them for use on another
network (or gives consumers the tools to do so). Such a situation would
push the Librarian's exemption to the limit of comprehension. In that
scenario, if such an entity were found liable, the exemption would be
rendered meaningless. An exemption granting protection for
unlocking cell phones by individual consumers would not apply to
those technically skilled enough actually to do the unlocking. Thus,
the only people legally able to unlock phones would be ordinary
consumers, few of whom have the knowledge and tools necessary to
unlock a phone. Given the outcome of a few key Tracfone cases,
however, and the eagerness with which other defendants are settling
existing cases, courts may never resolve whether non-consumer
unlockers are protected by the exemption. If a court never confronts
the internal contradictions of the DMCA in such a case, existing
precedent supports the interpretation that unlockers are liable under
the DMCA, the 2006 exemption notwithstanding.
IV. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS
This Note argues that cell phone unlocking does not belong in
the realm of copyright policy. Given the DMCA's origins, the
congressional debates, and the analyses of the Register of Copyrights
and various commentators, it is clear that the application of section
223. Id.
224. Kravets, supra note 101.
225. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
226. Id.
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1201 to issues of cell phone unlocking is unplanned and incidental.
Contrast this ill-fitting regime with the steady and consistent
decisions of Congress and the FCC regarding competition and
consumer rights in telecommunications policy. This policy history
favoring consumer protections, innovation, and competition fits more
naturally with the analysis of the problem than U.S. copyright law.
With the combination of unfair business practices alleged in the
California lawsuits and the settlement agreements on the books, the
trend in cell phone unlocking is moving quickly towards fewer barriers
between networks and fewer obstacles to consumers unlocking phones.
Part A of this Section analyzes the trends in
telecommunications policy and copyright law with respect to cell
phone unlocking. The Section argues that trends are leading toward
unlocked phones and open networks. Part B of this Section critically
analyzes the consumer protection and rights arguments from three
copyright cases-Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control
Components; Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technology, Inc.; and
Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engraving and
Consulting ("Storage Tek")-and available literature in the event that
the unlocking dispute carries on under copyright law. It concludes
that copyright law regarding unlocking needs more consistency to
combine the different arguments into a cohesive whole. Finally, Part C
examines solutions to the problem of locked cell phones and lays out a
dual framework for solving the problem. This framework is divided
into a conservative and an active approach, with the conservative
approach advocating an amendment to the DMCA and the active
approach utilizing a congressional act or FCC decision to remove the
problem of cell phone unlocking from the domain of copyright law
altogether.
A. Trends in Telecommunications and Copyright Law
Notwithstanding the Tracfone cases, the prospects for the
remaining handset unlocking suits in California are positive. Both
Sprint and Verizon already have settled, agreeing in some limited
form to unlock phones and open their networks. 227 The other providers
may settle the same types of cases. Verizon has also committed to
opening its network to any device meeting minimum standards.
228
227. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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Only a single Tracfone case, Dixon, includes a published decision; 229
almost all of the others have settled.
The Tracfone cases, while numerous, do not represent the final
word on the application of the DMCA and section 1201 to phone
unlocking. Though section 1201 is discussed as the grounds for the
complaint and the Librarian's exception is discounted as a defense, the
reality is that phone resellers are open to a litany of complaints,
mostly having to do with trademark infringement and dilution. 230
Section 1201 is not the central focus of these cases. It is clear that the
Librarian's exemption still protects individual unlockers.
It remains unclear what the outcome would be if a non-
reselling unlocker were sued. If one of the iPhone development team
hackers or another such individual who publishes how-to guides or
software to unlock phones were sued, Lexmark, Chamberlain, and
StorageTek should be interpreted to protect that activity by
implication from the exemption for personal unlocking. As will be
discussed below, protection for those who actually perform cell phone
unlocking is a logical, necessary, and precedented step when it comes
to section 1201 anticircumvention jurisprudence. 231
On the telecommunications side, Congress and the FCC have
long been committed to increasing competition and protecting
consumers. Though sometimes maddeningly slow, this policy-making
process has resulted in more innovation and consumer choice, as
demonstrated by Carterfone in 1968, the 1992 FCC bundling ruling,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the FCC's ruling on number
portability. These decisions show that Congress and the FCC seek to
destroy anticompetitive barriers and protect consumer choice. Perhaps
even more enshrined, especially by the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, is the goal of spurring
innovation. 232 Given the FCC's history of consumer protection,
including the fact that the 2008 auction of the 700 Megahertz
spectrum included a rider mandating network openness for whomever
purchased the spectrum (once a reserve price had been met),233 a
229. 475 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
230. See, e.g., Complaint at 13-17, Nokia v. Sol Wireless, No. 1:06-cv-20011-CMA (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 3, 2006) (alleging infringement and dilution of the NOKIA trademark).
231. See infra Section IV.B.
232. Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection, supra note 128.
233. See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules to Advance
Interoperable Pub. Safety Commc'ns and Promote Wireless Broadband Deployment (July 31,
2007), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publiclattachmatch/DOC275669Al.pdf
(describing the required open network platform); see also John Markoff & Matt Richtel, As
Spectrum Auction Nears, Google Wins Partial Victory in F.C.C. Ruling on Open Networks, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at C3 (explaining the FCC ruling and its implications).
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congressional or FCC mandate for opening networks and making
available unlocked phones seems possible in the next few years. Such
a decision would bring the United States into line with most other
countries in the world, which generally have embraced (and
sometimes mandated) open networks and unlocked phones in their
wireless networks. 234
B. Consumer Rights and Protections: Copyright Law and Consumer
Products
DMCA jurisprudence is sparse, even though ten years have
passed since the introduction of the Act. 235 In the last few years,
however, several cases, including two out of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and one out of the Sixth Circuit, have dealt with
the anticircumvention provisions of section 1201.236 Though decided on
narrow, fact-specific grounds offering no direct hope to cell phone
unlockers, 237 at least two of these cases do offer a guide to the evolving
and complicated copyright regime and the application of
anticircumvention rules.2 38 The FCC or Congress should act in the
arena of telecommunications law to provide the broadest, fairest, and
most consistent solution to the unlocking problem. If, however, the
government fails to act, then consumers and consumer advocates must
continue to fight unlocking battles on copyright grounds.
The essential holding in Chamberlain is that the plaintiff failed
to prove that it had not authorized consumers to use universal garage-
door openers with its product. 239 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in that case embarked upon a detailed and thorough statutory
analysis of section 1201.240 Essentially, the court distinguished
between access and infringement by pointing out that although the
234. See, e.g., Law No. 293 of Dec. 18, 1998, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 18, 1998, at 19,132 (mandating more network openness).
235. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(noting that, in 2004, no circuit except the 2nd had ever construed 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (the
anti-circumvention provision), and that the case involved only First Amendment issues, not "an
application of the statute to case-specific facts").
236. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1182-83; Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components,
387 F.3d 522, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2004); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g &
Consulting (StorageTek), 421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
237. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
238. As discussed above, Lexmark concludes that access to the program was not effectively
controlled since the user was free to access and copy it. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547. Since phone
locks do in fact effectively control access to the phone's firmware according to the court's
definition, this case is the least helpful of the three. Id. at 546-49.
239. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
240. Id. at 1192-1204.
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DMCA created new liability solely for unauthorized accessing of a
copyrighted work, there must be a "critical nexus between access and
protection"; the copyright owner must show that the unauthorized
access that section 1201 prohibits actually imperils a right owned by
the copyright holder. 241 If the unauthorized access only allows the
consumer to exercise a right he holds (e.g. the right to use the copy or
fair use), then the prohibitions of section 1201 do not apply.242
Essentially, the court blends access and infringement, holding that
consumers cannot be held liable for unauthorized access if the
copyright holder cannot also show that there has been copyright
infringement of some kind.243 This conclusion stands in stark contrast
to the arguments of the copyright holder, who argued that mere
unauthorized access (or trafficking in technology that facilitated
unauthorized access) created per se liability under section 1201.244
This decision is incredibly important for consumer advocates
who hope to win cases grounded in copyright. One commentator
concludes that the decision might be important for users of
copyrighted film and music because the circumvention controls in
section 1201 cannot be invoked if the consumers are conducting
noninfringing activity, such as transferring content onto different
platforms. 245 In the same way, if consumer advocates establish in
court that cell phone unlockers did not engage in infringing activity by
unlocking the phones (a more or less defensible position, depending on
what the unlocker did to the software in order to switch the phone's
network), then Chamberlain might support an argument that section
1201 does not make such unlockers liable and, without section 1201(a)
circumvention or copyright infringement, the trafficking provisions
cannot apply.246
StorageTek, coming after Chamberlain in the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, dealt with a repair company that had to make
a temporary copy of copyrighted code and breach software security in
order to repair computers. 247 After finding that the repair provisions of
47 U.S.C. section 117(c) did apply as a defense to infringement, the
241. Id. at 1204.
242. Id. at 1202-04.
243. Id. at 1204.
244. Id. at 1197.
245. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1119, 1144-50 (2008). The article also offers an excellent summary of Chamberlain and
Lexmark. Id. at 1132-37.
246. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
247. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting (StorageTek), 421 F.3d
1307, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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court addressed the DMCA claim. Relying on Chamberlain, the court
stated, "A copyright owner alleging a violation of § 1201(a)
consequently must prove that the circumvention of the technological
measure either 'infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by
the Copyright Act.' "248 The court concluded that since the defendant's
"activities do not constitute copyright infringement or facilitate
copyright infringement, StorageTek is foreclosed from maintaining an
action under the DMCA."249 Thus, both Chamberlain and StorageTek
offer hope to consumer advocates seeking the right to unlock cell
phones. If these advocates can prove that the circumvention of
firmware locks furthers a noninfringing use, then these cases support
a finding of no liability.
It is more difficult to argue that unlockers who circumvent
firmware protections make noninfringing use of the copyrighted
software. On a broader scale, advocates say that unlockers and
consumers are merely trying to use the phone for which the software
was written. Unfortunately, phone unlockers often erase the entire
mobile firmware or severely modify it in order to make the phone work
on other networks. Though some argue that modifying the firmware in
order to make it work on another network would be covered by 17
U.S.C. section 117, this argument is untested and may be rejected in
court. 25 0 If a court found that the actions taken with the firmware
were infringing, then the circumvention of access controls also would
give rise to liability under Chamberlain and StorageTek.
Alex Curtis of Public Knowledge, a digital rights public interest
group, argues that since it is legal for consumers to unlock cell phones,
it should logically and impliedly be legal for others to do the
unlocking. 251 Curtis writes, "If you may lawfully circumvent, the
implied right to develop and use the enabling tool must follow." 252
Curtis bases this idea on an article written about fair use of
copyrighted content by the public. 253 The article suggests that the
248. Id. at 1318.
249. Id.
250. It is not infringing for users to make an adaptation of a computer program so long as
the adaptation "is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner." 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2000).
251. Posting of Alex Curtis to Public Knowledge Policy Blog, What-the-iPhone Does
Unlocking Have to Do with the DMCA?, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1169 (Aug. 29,
2007, 10:27 EST).
252. Id.
253. Id. See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse
Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 981, 1005-09, 1035-36 (2007). The article also gives
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DMCA implementation of the WIPO treaties is tilted heavily toward
copyright owners, harming fair use of copyrights. The article proposes
a "reverse notice and takedown regime," in which those who would
make fair use of technically copyrighted content notify the copyright
holder before doing so. 25 4 In this way, consumers could make fair use
of copyrights (as well as the tools that allow that fair use), but
copyright holders would be protected.
One final copyright theory that consumer advocates might try
in court is the doctrine of copyright misuse. As explained by the court
in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, "Because copyright is
intended to protect only those works containing the requisite indicia of
creativity and originality, casting the shadow of its virtual monopoly
onto other unprotected works would constitute a 'misuse.' "255 Misuse
usually occurs when a copyright owner forces consumers to buy other
products in order to access a copyright (in a practice known as
"tying").256 This practice, which resembles the "bundling" of services
that wireless providers offer, may serve as a defense for those accused
of unlocking, but to date, most misuse claims in the technology arena
have failed. 257 As a doctrine, copyright misuse is not robust and, with
its scant history of success, it should not be the primary legal
argument raised against providers who lock cell phones. 258
C. Possible Solutions: Amending the DMCA and other Federal Actions
Though consumers could take several approaches to obtain a
favorable interpretation of the DMCA, 259 the most appropriate avenue
for solving the problem of cell phone unlocking is congressional or FCC
action through either: 1) a conservative approach that amends the
DMCA to make phone unlocking legal; or 2) a more active approach
that forces wireless carriers to open networks, unlock phones sold by
the carriers after a predetermined time period, and offer unlocked
phones as an alternative to locked phones sold with service.
an excellent account of the DMCA trilogy discussed above (Chamberlain, Lexmark, and
StorageTek). Id. at 1011-12, 1024-32.
254. Reichman, supra note 253, at 983-86.
255. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131, at *12 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting the affirmative defense of copyright misuse).
258. At least one commentator, however, has argued that the doctrine of copyright misuse
should be extended to cover copyright holders' misuse of the anticircumvention provisions of §
1201. Burk, supra note 35, at 1095-1140.
259. See supra Section IV.B.
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The simplest approach to solving the problem would be to
amend the DMCA to make cell phone unlocking legal. In effect, this
would codify the Librarian's exemption. To make the exemption
effective, however, the amendment also should provide that those who
unlock phones, whether as a service (free or paid) or by offering
directions or programs that do so, are immune from liability. This
exemption for unlockers is a commonsense extension of the exemption
for consumers. As discussed above, the law that gives consumers fair
use or unlocking rights with regard to copyrighted materials also must
legalize the technologies and processes that facilitate the exercise of
those rights.260 By analogy, if a professor is entitled to copy portions of
a video to show to a class, the technology that allows that copying
must be deemed "noninfringing." Otherwise, the fair use rights
granted to the professor (or consumer) are meaningless. A possible
amendment might read:
17 U.S.C. section 1201(a) is amended as follows:
By adding subsection (1)(F), which reads:
"Owners of devices which connect to wireless networks are not liable under paragraph
(1)(A) if they circumvent technological measures protecting computer programs in the
form of firmware for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless communication
network."
By adding subsection (2)(D), which reads:
"No person shall be held liable under paragraph (2) if he manufactures, imports, offers
to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof in order to accomplish the lawful circumvention described in
paragraph (1)(A) by owners of devices that connect to wireless networks."
Hence, the rights of consumers to circumvent cell phone locks would
be protected, as would the rights of those who actually perform the
unlocking.
Such an amendment, however, should only be a first step.
Though it would make unlocking legal for consumers, it also would
leave the cell phone locking problem in the realm of copyright law
where it does not belong. Instead, a more active approach would
amend 47 U.S.C. section 251,261 giving power to the FCC to mandate
that wireless providers: 1) open their networks to allow consumers to
switch providers; 2) allow previously purchased phones and devices to
connect to new networks; 3) unlock phones and devices after a certain
260. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
261. This is the location of the number portability provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.
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period in which consumers fulfill their contracts; and 4) sell unlocked,
unbundled versions of the phones that currently are bundled with
service. Admittedly, these reforms are far-reaching and probably are
not immediately attainable. However, the trends in settlements,
network openness, and global competition all point towards these
reforms. For the benefit of consumers, these changes should take
effect sooner rather than later.
The first three reforms, which deal with network openness,
could be added as an amendment to 47 U.S.C. section 251, the site of
the number portability amendment to the Telecommunications Act of
1996.262 Section 251(b) describes the "obligations of all local exchange
carriers."263 An amendment to that section might read,
47 U.S.C. section 251 is amended as follows:
By adding subsection (b)(6), which reads:
"(6) Network Openness
The duty to hold open their telecommunications networks to any device that meets
nonrestrictive minimum technical and security standards, as provided by the local
exchange carrier, in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission."
By adding subsection (b)(7), which reads:
"(7) Handset Portability
The duty to provide handset portability with requirements prescribed by the
Commission."
The first amendment would force network providers to provide
the kind of network openness to which Verizon has committed. 264 The
FCC would oversee the transition and would determine the level at
which technical and security standards would be nonrestrictive. This
grant of power to the FCC, as well as the proposed statutory language,
would ensure that wireless providers could maintain the security and
stability of their networks by mandating minimum technical and
security standards while raising the level of innovation, competition,
and consumer protections that have concerned the FCC for many
years. After all, if the FCC requires wireless providers to hold open
their networks, consumers quickly will migrate to the provider with
the best service, forcing other providers to improve their services.
262. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
263. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b). Among these obligations is that of § 251(b)(2): "The duty to provide,
to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed
by the Commission." Id. at § 251(b)(2).
264. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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Inventors and entrepreneurs would have the freedom they need to
create new devices that utilize the improved networks.
The second provision of the above amendment would allow the
FCC to require providers to sell unlocked phones, thereby removing
the anticompetitive obstacles for consumers who want to switch
wireless providers. "Handset portability" would be defined as "the
ability to disconnect from one wireless network and use the same
device to connect to any other compatible wireless network, subject to
contractual terms and obligations." The FCC could create rules
governing phone unlocking, such as mandating that wireless providers
either sell unlocked phones or unlock them at consumers' requests.
The final reform could come in the form of an FCC rule, but it
probably would occur organically if the previous reforms were put into
place. Once network openness and handset portability are established,
wireless providers, considering their business interests, would sell
unlocked versions of the bundled phones that they offer at higher
prices. Since wireless providers would still be the largest marketplace
for new phones, they would have the opportunity to profit separately
from the service and the phones instead of tying the two together. Of
course, even in the face of regulations establishing openness and
portability, wireless providers might make exclusivity deals. A perfect
example of this phenomenon occurred in Germany where T-Mobile
gained exclusive rights to carry the iPhone. Challenged in a German
court by rival provider Vodafone, T-Mobile initially lost when its
exclusivity deal was invalidated by a lower court (mandating that T-
Mobile sell an unlocked version of the iPhone). Eventually, however,
that decision was overturned by an appellate court. 265 Thus, even in
the face of open markets and portability mandates, exclusivity deals
might survive. Such deals would be rare, however, and consumers
would still reap the benefits of quick and easy unlocking as well as
open and robust networks. Finally, wireless providers still could make
exclusivity deals with phone manufacturers such as Apple, reaping
the benefits of being the only store in town to sell a new product.
V. CONCLUSION
The introduction of the iPhone in the U.S. wireless market
provoked a flurry of activity and new scrutiny of the ability of wireless
265. See Victoria Shannon, iPhone Must Be Offered Without Contract Restrictions, German
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007 at C4 (describing the German case which mandated that
T-Mobile sell an unlocked version of the iPhone). But see Paul Betts, Chris Hughes, & Joe Leahy,
Vodafone Tactics Backfire, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 6, 2007, at 16 (describing the reversal of
the initial decision).
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providers to lock phones, an issue that had lain dormant for years.
The year before the iPhone was introduced, the Librarian of Congress
passed an exemption allowing consumers to unlock their own phones,
but the widespread and competitive attempts to unlock the iPhone
caught the media's and consumer population's attention in ways that
the 2006 exemption process and numerous lawsuits had not.
In 2007, at least two lawsuits related to handset locking claims
in California settled, as did suits against handset unlockers and
resellers in Florida and Texas, among other places. A congressional
subcommittee held hearings, the iPhone was introduced worldwide,
and a wireless company, Verizon, vowed to open its network. Taken
together, these developments represent a storm of controversy
surrounding handset locking and network openness.
Over the course of the last few years, many litigants, reporters,
and scholars have come to realize that the debate over handset locking
is largely (if not exclusively) governed by the DMCA, a copyright bill.
Though the class action lawsuits in California are based on unfair
business practice claims, it is copyright law that currently determines
the course of handset locking litigation. This Note has examined the
applicable copyright law, the process behind the creation of that law
(in the form of the DMCA), and the process of exempting consumers
from portions of that law.
Copyright law is not the most appropriate venue for this
debate. The Register of Copyrights has concluded that locking
handsets is a product of a business model rather than a practice
designed to protect copyrights. Though Congress should amend the
DMCA to allow consumers to unlock phones and to protect the actual
unlockers, such an amendment is not the best possible solution.
Instead, Congress and scholars should look to established
telecommunications law to lead the way in resolving the jumble of
rights and responsibilities that currently surrounds handset locks.
Congress and the FCC should amend telecommunications law to
sweep away uncompetitive barriers created by wireless providers and
promote competition, innovation, and consumer protection. In the long
run, destroying these barriers will lead to a more robust
telecommunications network in the United States, more innovation in
network and wireless device technology, and better and more
competitive U.S. telecommunications companies, which are goals that
should be embraced by the government, corporations, and consumers
alike.
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